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Abstract: The application of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to United States 
(U.S.)–Nigeria’s trade relations is a watershed in bilateral trade experience. However, extant literature 
is inconclusive on the existential conditions of U.S.–Nigeria’s economic interactions which necessitated 
the emergence of AGOA. This study discussed the foundations for United States (U.S.)–Nigeria’s trade 
relations within the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Data is obtained from primary and 
secondary sources. The centre-periphery brand of the dependency theory is used to x-ray U.S.–
Nigeria’s economic prior to the commencement of the application of the provisions AGOA in 2001. 
The results indicate that though U.S.–Nigeria’s trade relations intensified in the years preceding AGOA 
there were built-in impediments to the bilateral trade. It establishes that an adequate appreciation of the 
pre-policy situation is needed for AGOA to make comprehensive impacts on U.S.–Nigeria’s bilateral 
trade. It recommends the need to bring Nigeria’s dependence on the U.S. to an end. 
Keywords: Preferential Trade Arrangement; Dependency; Development. 
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1. Introduction 
The application of the provisions of the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) to United States (U.S.)–Nigeria’s trade relations starting from year 2001 is 
a radical departure from existential economic relations between the two nations. 
However, the period, 1960–2000, laid the foundation for U.S.–Nigeria’s trade 
relations under AGOA. In discussing U.S.–Nigeria’s trade relations under AGOA 
extant literature have not paid adequate attention to understanding the pre-policy 
trade conditions of the trade partners which necessitated the introduction of AGOA. 
Economic historians might object to the cut-off date of 1960 because they consider 
pre-1960 interactions as equally important. Important as such interactions may be 
(or indeed are), they are not crucial to understanding U.S.–Nigeria’s trade under 
AGOA because it is not concerned with territories or entities or activities except 
those that took place after the creation of modern Nigeria as a sovereign political 
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unit. As a sovereign political unit in the international arena Nigeria came into being 
in 1960. Though its making spawns hundreds of years and embraces periods of 
Arabic influences in the North and European influence in the South (Nigerian 
Handbook, 1970). But then, what is AGOA and what is it about U.S.–Nigeria’s 
economic relations that made AGOA imperative? 
 
2. AGOA 
According to the U.S. Congress, the formulation of AGOA was based on certain 
findings. Among the findings are (1) the U.S. and sub-Sahara African (SSA) 
countries have a mutual interest in promoting stable economic growth in SSA; (2) 
SSA is rich in natural and human resources; (3) SSA is of economic and political 
significance to the U.S.; (4) trade represents a powerful tool for economic 
development; and (5) reduction of trade barriers will enhance SSA’s commercial and 
political ties with the U.S.  
To qualify as an eligible country to participate in AGOA the Act demands that SSA 
countries meet certain eligibility criteria. AGOA authorises the U.S. President to (1) 
designate a sub-Saharan African country as an “eligible” sub-Saharan African 
country if the President determines that the country meets specified eligibility 
requirements and (2) terminate a designation if the President elects that an eligible 
country is not making continual progress in meeting those requirements. Some of 
these criteria are (a) established and making continual progress toward establishing 
a market-based economy, rule of law, elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and 
investment; (b) does not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security 
or foreign policy interests; and (c) does not engage in gross violations of 
internationally recognised human rights or provide support for acts of international 
terrorism and cooperates in international efforts to eliminate human rights violations 
and terrorists activities. Based on these criteria, the U.S. monitors and evaluates SSA 
countries annually to determine which of them should remain eligible to AGOA.  
AGOA’s duty-free provisions cover about 6000 articles including steel items, 
automotive components, handbags, gloves, footwear, iron, oil, petroleum, minerals, 
precious stones, textiles, apparel and a variety of food products (USTR, 2015) from 
SSA countries. According to Jones (2009) and Schneidman and Lewis (2012) 
majority of tariff reduction under AGOA is for non-agricultural commodities such 
as oil, petroleum, minerals, precious stones, textiles, and apparel. Meanwhile, SSA 
countries’ articles get to the U.S. market duty-free only when the growth, product, 
or manufacture of such a country is not import-sensitive in the context of imports 
from beneficiary SSA countries.  
For instance, duty-free applies to SSA countries’ textile and apparel if (1) an 
effective visa system, domestic laws, and enforcement procedures to prevent 
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unlawful importation to the U.S.; (2) enacted legislation to permit United States 
Customs Service verification teams to the country; (3) report promptly to the United 
States Custom Service’s request on the country’s total exports and imports; and (4) 
report timely to the United State Customs Service’s request for document 
establishing the place of production, the number and identification of the types of 
production machinery used, number of workers employed in its production, and 
certification from the manufacturer and exporter of such articles. 
 
3. The Nature of U.S.–Nigeria’s Economic Relations Prior to AGOA 
Prior to the creation of AGOA British colonialism in sub-Sahara Africa prepared the 
ground for economic relations between the U.S. and Nigeria. The external economic 
relations structure left behind in Nigeria by the British in 1960 was predominantly 
Anglo-centric. From the 1960s, a bilateral relationship developed between Nigeria 
and the U.S. after the former’s independence from Britain. This began with the 
understanding that the veto of the U.S was required for Nigeria’s entry into the 
United Nations Organisation and becoming a member. The U.S. was, however, 
conscious not to disrupt the links between Britain and Nigeria lest British economy 
be dislocated. This was due to the substantial British investments in Nigeria 
immediately after colonialism. So, the U.S. simply followed Britain’s lead in 
economic relations with Nigeria.  
As a consequence, up till the 1970s, the U.S. neither had nor adopted a coordinated 
or coherent economic view for its relations with Nigeria. This was excused on the 
understanding that the U.S. does not enjoy a deep-seated historical relationship with 
SSA. The fact that the U.S. was never a colonial power made it somewhat distant to 
Nigeria. At most, Washington was contented with its ally’s (Britain’s) hold on 
Nigeria in so far as it was seen as an attempt to keep out Nigeria from communism. 
The economic relation between Nigeria and the U.S. was understood and projected 
on that basis. Consequent upon that, the two countries for a long time never had a 
coordinated economic policy towards each other.  
Therefore, U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations emerged not through the dynamics of 
economic linkages, but from British colonialism. U.S. policy towards Nigeria after 
independence snowballed from the established presence of its ally, the United 
Kingdom, in the country. Beyond Britain, it became expedient that U.S.–Nigeria's 
economic relations be anchored on certain foreign economic policy for national self-
adjustment and adaptation to the external world. In the words of Akindele 
It is by the means of such a policy that the country communicates its economic 
“demands” and needs to the external world, advertises its domestic economic 
resources for export purposes, seeks to augment its resource deficiencies, defines 
and articulates its conception of a just and equitable international economic order 
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and participates generally in the continuously expanding cobweb of international 
economic transactions (Akindele, 1988, p. 12). 
The main objective of such a policy, in the context of the competitive struggle for 
power, influence and domination in the global economic system, Akindele (1988) 
went further, is to, … promote the country’s national interest, especially by seeking 
not only to influence the external behaviour of other states in the image of its 
preferences but also to minimise the influence of other states in its actions (Akindele, 
1988, p. 18).  
The submission by Akindele (1988) agrees with the report of one United States 
Special Mission to Africa which defined American interest in Africa (including 
Nigeria) as follows: 
An interest in the evolution of Africa in a manner not inimical to our democratic type 
of government, the exclusion of influences unfriendly to our way of life, the hope of 
having access to the raw materials of that continent, primarily to safeguard our 
minimum strategic needs; to increase our trade with all African countries, and to 
exercise moral leadership as benefits our honourable traditions (Smith, 1961, p. 8). 
Notwithstanding, it was not until 1976 when Jimmy Carter came to power in the U.S. 
that Washington started what can be regarded as a coordinated economic policy 
towards Nigeria. Carter’s administration had many young black citizens like Andrew 
Young. The administration was thus disposed towards SSA in general and Nigeria 
in particular. Carter tried to ‘weave a world wide web of bilateral, political and, 
where appropriate, economic relations with new emerging regional “influential” 
(Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 53-54). In pursuit of this, in 1978, Carter visited Nigeria. This 
was the first visit by an American President. 
The U.S. and Nigeria have a few similarities and dissimilarities. While Nigeria has 
the largest concentration of black people in Africa, the U.S. house the largest number 
of blacks in the Diaspora (Ola, 2017). Nigeria is characterised by underdeveloped 
and dependent economic system and by a low standard of living for the majority of 
its people. Nigeria’s peripheral position in the international capitalist system is 
largely a function of its colonial conquest, which is maintained today through the 
neo-colonial processes. The U.S., on the other hand, is characterised by a strong 
commitment to liberal, democratic, political values. It has also been characterised by 
sustained economic growth and technological progress, almost full employment, 
structurally transformed and flexible economic system with a considerable amount 
of international economic, financial and military power. The U.S. occupies a 
hegemonic position in the contemporary international system why Nigeria attempts 
to occupy such a position in Africa.  
From the onset, the relationship between the U.S. and Nigeria was anchored on the 
great differences in resources, technologies, interests, perceptions and influence 
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(Ola, 2017). While Nigeria recognises the limits of its power the U.S. opted to 
integrate Nigeria into its sphere of influence by offering patronising aid and hand-
downs. Indeed, domestic economic considerations of both U.S. and Nigeria have 
been the foundations of the relations. This is not really different to what generally 
happens at the international arena. As a matter of fact, the history of international 
economic interactions portrays a saga of cheating, chicanery, and all manners of both 
tasteful and distasteful appropriation and maneuver of economic position. In this 
saga, the successful states have often been those defined the rules to cheat and 
maneuver economic position to prevent economic parity. This shows that in real 
economic life, growths rarely ever occur by the charity or benevolence of states. 
Rather, what winning states do is to develop through foreign and domestic policies 
the application of economic policies for domestic use and later for international 
exploitation. That is why the critical parameter for assessing economic proficiency 
in a state is whether that state benefits maximally from its economic interactions. 
The Nigerian economy is a typical Southern peripheral, mono-cultural economy. 
Nigeria’s participation in international trade has been based on the production of 
primary commodities-oriented mainly towards the market of U.S. (among others). 
Because of the international capitalist division of labour and the law of comparative 
advantage, what Nigeria owns in the U.S.–Nigeria’s economic equation, as its 
national asset, is only raw materials (crude oil and gas) which are mostly exhaustible. 
This is in contrast to the U.S. that owns; controls and dominates capital and 
technology, the instruments that mediate between man and nature in production. 
Nigeria’s energy resources, Nigeria’s very life-blood, is controlled by the world 
market and continued to feed the American economy, which dominates the 
international system of management. Not even OPEC has been able to help Nigeria 
flex its economic muscle as an owner of an important resource needed by the U.S. 
Rather Nigeria has been at the mercy of the U.S. concerning demand and prices. For 
instance, in 1974, the U.S. in concert with other Western governments set up the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) with the function to abolish competition 
resulting from the energy crisis between Western consumer governments. The long-
term strategy of IEA is to enforce a uniform strategy for the defence of the common 
interests of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
governments, vis-à-vis OPEC governments, like Nigeria’s. Its tasks include 
guaranteeing the supply of oil to all its members, coordinating measures to reduce 
consumption of OPEC's, nay Nigeria's, oil, establishing an information system on 
the oil market, and drawing up and implementing a long-term cooperation 
programme for a more rational use of energy and for production of substitutes and 
alternative sources of energy (Nwoke, 1987).  
Despite the skewed beginnings of U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations aid and 
development assistance were early starters in the bilateral interactions. According to 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 15, no 3, 2019 
272 
the U.S. State Department, “the primary interest of the U.S. in Nigeria is to see it 
grow and prosper, within the free world, as a leader and good example for other 
African countries” (U.S. Department of State, 1964, SP70D19114862:3). For 
instance, in the 1962-68 National Development Plan the sum of $949.2 million (for 
public expenditure and constituting 50 percent of the total cost of the plan) was to be 
raised through external loans and grants. Of this amount, the U.S. alone provided 
more than 50 percent. In the immediate aftermath of Nigeria’s independence in 1960 
a five-man U.S. delegation visited Nigeria to study areas of possible economic 
cooperation. On the basis of the economic mission’s recommendations the U.S. 
government announced that it would provide Nigeria with $225 million aid which 
was given through USAID. In 1964, Nigeria received 50 percent of U.S. overall aid 
to Africa (Ate, 1988). The disbursement of the aid package, which proceeded 
unevenly had a particular significance and laid the foundation for expansion in U.S.–
Nigeria’s economic relations. The aid offer opened a floodgate for increased 
economic ties; it became an avenue for a great influx of American technical 
assistance personnel, while it stimulated American companies’ investment prospects 
in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria developed a dependent asymmetrical network of 
relationship with the U.S. over time. 
By 1966 the U.S. has become the largest single contributor of aid and technical 
assistance to Nigeria which amounted to 49.5 percent and 52.2 percent respectively 
(Ate, 1988, p. 199). Overall, the United States government and its related agencies 
constituted the dominant source of foreign aid for Nigeria in the period. U.S. 
contribution of technical assistance personnel by 1966 was about 52 percent. 
Between 1960 and 1967 capital aid and technical assistance were the centre-piece of 
U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations. In the area of foreign trade, about 80 percent of 
Nigeria’s exports went mainly to Britain and the United States. Seventy percent of 
its imports came from the same sources. Nigeria concentrated its fullest economic 
attention in the United States and Britain and cooperated rather intimately with the 
U.S. on major contemporary African issues. The simple reason for this is that the 
Nigerian leadership of the time and other factions of the ruling strata were products 
and beneficiaries of the United States. As a matter of fact, the Nigerian government 
of the era espoused definite interests whose attainment they considered possible only 
within a framework of a neo-colonial relationship with the United States (Ate, 1986). 
 
4. Local Industries and Businesses in Nigeria Prior to AGOA 
Between 1960 and 2000, Nigeria’s economy was underdeveloped and primarily 
resource-based. Its manufacturing sector, engaged predominantly in consumer goods 
production and, is heavily imports dependent. For instance, the nation’s apparel 
production sector comprised primarily of a cottage industry of small or individual 
tailoring operations scattered throughout the country’s informal sector markets. 
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There was only one apparel facility in the Export Processing Zone in Calabar that 
adds value to tee shirts by packaging them. This is known locally as a “packet shirt” 
operation (Personal interview at Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) 
office, Lagos, 2016). Nigeria has other apparel making firms like; 
I. Afprint of Lagos is one of the largest textile groups in Nigeria. As a member of a 
multinational conglomerate, Afprint has sister companies in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and related businesses in 25 other countries. 
II. Bhojsons Industries of Lagos manufactures cotton and polyester yarns and fabrics. 
With 152 looms and 113 jets up to 153cm widths, they are able to manufacture 
mattress covers and are exporting cotton sheeting to Europe. 
III. The Churchgate Group of Lagos is a large industrial conglomerate with eight 
textile related companies including state-of-the-art cotton and polyester spinning and 
weaving, textile supplies and an export business. They supply men’s suiting and 
shirting to the European markets in a wide range of weaves, weights, blends and yarn 
counts. Sister companies are involved in chemicals and dyes, research and 
development, and textile finishing. 
IV. United Nigerian Textiles of Kaduna employs about 20,000 people in its cotton 
African print operations. This company now exports to ECOWAS countries used to 
export to the US and Hong Kong. 
V. African Textile Manufacturing, Ltd. in Kano is a four-year-old manufacturer of 
African printed cotton with about 2,000 employees (Ola, 2017). 
Nigeria had all of the necessary competitive elements for a successful apparel 
manufacturing industry. This includes: 
1. Installed textile manufacturing base and materials cluster with world-class 
potential to service AGOA quota; 
2. Cotton producer—medium staple adequate for many apparel applications; 
3. EPZ capability with legal provisions for soft working capital and subsidised 
utility infrastructure; 
4. Ample labour at competitive rates; 
5. More favourable port location in comparison to Mauritius, Madagascar, South 
Africa, etc. — import economy with huge backhaul availability at competitive cost 
saving 2-8 days shipping times over Eastern African ports; 
6. History of FDI from Asia and India; 
7. Large rural population—apparel manufacturing plants can do well 
competitively if they are located a significant distance from large cities (Ola, 2017). 
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But, during the period under study, local industries and businesses in Nigeria could 
not utilised the advantages due to several challenges. To start with, technology 
exchange between the U.S. and Nigeria during the period explains the difficulties 
experienced by local industries and businesses. The growth of knowledge intensify 
production by increasing scientific and technological interactions and the need for 
innovation complicates the importance of the four dimensions of a national system 
of innovation — human capital, knowledge creation, supply innovation capacity, 
demand innovation capacity and their complementarities — as a force majeure in 
determining Nigeria’s potential. Institutions in Nigeria have benefited from facilities 
like the internet online learning, telemedicine and teleconferencing with their 
partners in the U.S. (Personal interview at USAID office, Lagos, 2016). 
This U.S. to Nigeria’s technology transfer occurred through a variety of processes, 
including licenses and patents, supplies of machines and equipment, exchange 
between scientific bodies of Nigeria and the U.S. (Personal interview at FIIRO 
office, Lagos 2016). Others came in through purchases of technical publications, 
consulting and engineering services of Americans (Personal interview at United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Abuja, 2016). The rest were 
acquired through on-site training of Nigerian personnel by American experts 
(Personal interview at Nigeria national Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
Headquarters, Abuja, 2016), and Nigerians studying in the United States. However, 
estimates of U.S.–Nigeria technology flow vary from the modification and 
adaptation process actually costing Nigeria more than if it had developed its own 
technology to a value added of fourteen times what would have been received if 
developed domestically by Nigeria.  
It is clear that the fundamental challenge in Nigeria is the appallingly inadequate 
infrastructure and sore lack of capacity. The search for new inventions and 
innovations as vital resources to position Nigeria on the path of economic 
development cannot be over-emphasised. That is why a major concern of local 
industries and businesses in Nigeria relates to the ‘appropriateness’ of the meagre 
technology that came to them from the U.S. (Personal interview at OPEXA office, 
Lagos, 2016). Much of the technology transferred was typically capital intensive and 
labour saving, whereas the chief problem in Nigeria was unemployment (Personal 
interview at FIIRO office, Lagos, 2016). Given Nigeria's need to provide 
employment those technologies are inappropriate for local industries and businesses 
(Personal interview at MAN office, Lagos, 2016). The problem was compounded by 
different circumstances under which such technology was developed and the 
unwillingness of U.S. multinational corporations to adapt them to the Nigerian 
settings (Personal interview at FIIRO office, Lagos, 2016). Additionally, most of the 
machinery and equipment transferred to Nigerian local industries and businesses 
from the U.S. were “inappropriate” because they were machines of older vintage 
(Personal interview at MAN office, Lagos, 2016). Not only was the technology out 
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of date their consumers in Nigeria were charged high prices. The contradiction 
between local industries and businesses’ needs for modern technology and the desire 
to pay only “justifiable prices” is a function of the different values of global 
economy. 
Nigeria is also incensed by the fact that payments for technology strain its balance-
of-payment position vis-à-vis the U.S. (Personal interview at Ministry of Trade and 
Investment, Abuja, 2016). One contributor to the unnecessarily inflated price of the 
technology which Nigerian acquired from the U.S. has to do with the fact that 
technology is often sold in packages (Personal interview at OPEXA office, Lagos, 
2016). For example, tie-in clauses in certain contracts compel a license to purchase 
unpatented goods from the licensor; in other cases, technology are supplied only 
through turnkey operations where the U.S. undertakes full responsibility for 
construction of a plant and managing it until local personnel are ready to do so 
(Personal interview at OPEXA office, Lagos, 2016). Particularly where the recipient 
of the technology is a subsidiary of the supplier, as often was the case, Nigeria 
acquires little, if any, ‘new’ technical know-how. What local industries and 
businesses in Nigeria find most repugnant is that more often than not some elements 
of the package are overpriced, unnecessary, and or available locally (Personal 
interview at OPEXA office, Lagos, 2016).  
Generally, the technology available to Nigeria was much more heavily reliant on the 
use of raw materials and has a lower marginal product of labour (Personal interview 
at MAN Office Lagos, 2016), and so firms using that technology pay lower wages. 
Meanwhile, the wages that are paid within a nation are dependent on the extra output 
that an extra worker is able to produce (the marginal product) and the cost of the 
other inputs (capital, materials etc.) required to enable that worker to produce. But 
economic development through productive activities occurs mostly through the 
channel of wages (Personal interviews in Lagos and Abuja, 2016). A few local 
industries and businesses in Nigeria were, however, exposed to new technology and 
employee training (Personal interview at OPEXA office, Lagos, 2016). But, the 
skills needed to maintain, use and develop the knowledge were not transferred. This 
means that Nigeria remains stuck in the primary sector. To worsen the case, most 
American consumers do not expect to find processed food and consumer products in 
their local Wal-Mart with a “made in Nigeria” label, without the exploration and 
development of new sectors equalling the global economic trading of services and 
technology. 
The overwhelming proportion of Nigerian firms and businesses regard power and 
voltage fluctuations as major obstacles to their operations (Personal interviews in 
Lagos and Abuja, 2016). Most of the firms and businesses ranked electricity as their 
number one problem. This is followed by problems associated with road networks 
and third, by telecommunications. Most Nigerian firms and businesses, for example, 
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have to make a significant investment in the private provision of generators as 
insurance against uncertainties associated with poor publicly provided electricity. 
Thus, the need for back up alternatives in respect of power supply contributes 
significantly to the cost of doing business and the lack of competitiveness in external 
markets. Ultimately, the costs of doing business in Nigeria remain among the highest 
in the world. This submission agrees, substantially, with the World Bank (2010) 
report which stated that it costs 80% of an average Nigerian’s annual salary to 
register a company in the country. 
In sum, the U.S. undermined Nigeria's production base in favour of American 
manufactured goods (Personal interview at MAN office, Lagos, 2016). The status of 
local industries and businesses in Nigeria shows that Nigeria lacked the capabilities 
to attain economic development. Nigeria tended to have neglected the iron law of 
industrialisation that stipulates convergence of domestic use of resources and 
consumption (Clive Threat) as the foundation for autonomous development. For 
instance, Nigeria has not been able to effectively implement policies on research; 
expatriate quota has been abused, the educational system, the foundation of all 
development has been riddled with crisis and for some inexplicable reasons, Nigeria 
did not to come to terms with the idea that only Nigerians can and will develop 
Nigeria while foreign interests will only play in accordance with the environment 
they meet. 
 
5. Opportunities and Challenges of U.S.–Nigeria’s Trade Relations prior 
to AGOA 
Before the emergence of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), U.S.–
Nigeria’s economic relations were characterised by disarticulation and incoherence. 
U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations was characterised by the absence of forward and 
backward linkages, complementarity and reciprocity in production. There was an 
absence of reciprocity of exchange between them. The extraction of resources in 
Nigeria was dictated, partly, by the needs of the U.S. It appears that the Nigerian 
extractive industries were purely functional for gathering and exporting the 
commodities of Nigeria, to the U.S. It did not constitute in any way a coherent line 
of production. Neither did it contribute to the building of a coherent economy with 
Nigeria.  
The story of the Nigerian extractive industry, especially crude oil, illustrates the 
haphazard development. The oil industry of Nigeria is an excellent example of the 
disarticulation of U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations. Nigerian refineries were non-
functional. The incoherence of the oil industry rendered related ancillary industries 
chaotic as well. Optimum performing refineries are lacking in Nigeria; since the 
extractive industries are posed to supply unrefined crude to the U.S. rather than get 
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finished products to local consumers. This means that the extractive industries were 
not designed in a way that they would yield maximum benefit to the growth of 
Nigeria. And, U.S. demand for Nigerian oil makes the exploitation at Nigerian oil 
fields uneconomical. 
Something similar to the activities of extractive industries happened in the 
development of Nigerian primary commodities for the American market. The U.S. 
was naturally interested only in the most profitable Nigerian commodities. To obtain 
an adequate supply of the preferred commodities the U.S. covertly discouraged the 
production of some other commodities. This was done by refusing to buy such 
commodities from Nigeria. When this happens, it was accepted without too much 
thought on the implications of encouraging the production of particular 
commodities. It was assumed that what was good for international capitalism of the 
U.S. was good for Nigeria.  
Nigeria’s trade with the U.S. was characterised by reliance on a few export 
commodities for foreign exchange earnings, especially oil. It would be recalled that 
it was after the arrival of American oil multinational corporations that crude oil was 
successfully exported from Nigeria. Nigeria had not started exporting crude oil until 
about 1947. But the exportation of crude oil grew so rapidly that it soon began to 
dominate the Nigerian economy. By 1971 the country was already the biggest 
exporter of crude oil in SSA. By 2000 crude oil accounted for about 80% of the value 
of Nigeria’s exports. The problem of a narrow resource base is related to the basic 
fact that the U.S. trade with Nigeria was done in the interest of capitalist 
accumulation and not in the interests of growing Nigeria’s economy. The U.S. made 
Nigeria to put a lot of effort in the production of crude oil, because overseas demand 
was good starting from the 1970s, through incentives. Before export of crude oil 
from Nigeria its exports had been dominated by palm kernels, palm oil, groundnuts, 
cocoa, and bananas (Ukeje, 2011).  
Instead of adding to the old sources of foreign exchange the new commodity replaced 
the old ones so that the composition of export commodity changed without achieving 
diversification. Thus, in U.S.-Nigeria’s economic relations oil replaced palm kernels 
and groundnuts and cocoa instead of supplementing them. It might be tempting to 
attribute this narrow base for foreign exchanges earnings to the natural endowments 
of Nigeria – its mineral endowments, and its climatic conditions. But this would be 
quite mistaken because U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations had much to do with it. 
In the main, Americans tried to market what manufactured goods they could. They 
encouraged the development of export commodities when and where it was 
profitable to do so and did not really bother themselves much with the question as to 
how their economic relations fitted in with the overall growth of Nigeria. With this, 
Nigeria began to experience shortages in the supply of traditional food crops, 
changes in land use creating changes in land tenure, uneven distribution of wealth, 
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dependence on a few export products. Associated with all these sort of changes were 
profound economic imbalanced and growth which led to social disequilibrium that 
upsets the balance of the Nigerian economy. 
Furthermore, U.S. economic relations with Nigeria did not do very much to 
encourage the growth of manufacturing. U.S. economic interest in Nigeria lay 
primarily in the fact that it was a source of raw materials and market for American 
manufactured goods. American companies doing business in Nigeria did not 
consider that the industrialisation of the country merited serious attention. The 
Nigerian government itself appeared to have had little or no enthusiasm for 
manufacturing. Manufacturing was further discouraged by the rudimentary 
development of the infrastructures in the country as well as the limited possibilities 
of economies of scale. 
However, some degree of development in manufacturing took place though the 
manufacturing or industrial activity was of a most rudimentary nature: food and 
beverages, tobacco, base metal, non-durable consumer goods, basic chemical 
products, building materials, furniture, leather and leather products. The reasons for 
the rudimentary development of manufacturing in Nigeria are discernible. Those 
who made investment decisions did so according to the necessities of the process, 
particularly the quest for maximum return on investment in the minimum amount of 
time. To sum up, the factors for minimum manufacturing in Nigeria are as follows: 
the multiplicity of decision centres, the ad hoc and interest-oriented character of 
investment decisions, the reliance of the manufacturing sector on imported materials, 
the non-availability of infrastructures which especially influenced the type and 
location of investment. 
In contrast, the Nigerian oil economy displays a pathological maturity, like a highly 
accelerated ageing process. The oil economy suffered the disadvantages of 
monopoly without having enjoyed the advantages of competition. On the one hand, 
a typical monopoly economy thrives by the continuous capitalisation of surplus-
value. It creates and sustains demand for the goods and services which it offers. 
When the monopolist is able to beat competitors and corner the market all the better 
for it. To improve its competitive status, the monopolist tries to expand production 
to take advantage of economies of scale and reduce his unit cost. He may also try to 
increase the productivity of labour by introducing mechanisation and thereby 
increasing the organic composition of capital. Here lies the positive role of monopoly 
and competition. 
On the other hand, the competition among capitalists leads to the development of 
productive forces – as capitalists expand production to reduce costs, develop new 
tools, introduce new machines that make things better or cheaper, gain new sources 
of the supply of raw materials, and develop new processes of production. This is why 
capitalism has contributed more to the development of productive forces than all the 
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modes of production which preceded it, and it has been able to do so because of the 
dynamics of competition inherent in it. But in the Nigerian capitalism – oil 
exploration and export – short-circuited history and moved directly to a monopoly 
stage. This monopoly hampered the development of productive forces by 
discouraging competition. This point bears importantly in any attempt to understand 
the persistence of Nigerian underdevelopment.  
To take on another dimension to the underdevelopment of Nigeria, the control of 
Nigeria’s reserves and the issues of currency rested in the U.S. – through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such control was justified by arguing that it 
gave Nigeria monetary stability and international status and helped its trade. 
However, Nigeria’s monetary dependence on the U.S. was essentially a means of 
exploitation. For instance, the IMF mobilised capital from Nigeria’s external 
reserves and loan it to American businessmen. The exploitation of Nigeria’s 
monetary dependence was done mainly through the manipulation of Nigeria’s 
reserves and currency. The Nigerian Naira issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(established in 1958) was to be backed by the dollar reserves held in the U.S. Now, 
the foreign exchange which Nigeria earned by the sale of its exports was held in the 
U.S.  
Therefore, through its membership of neo-liberal institutions of capitalism (The 
IMF, the World Bank and the WTO) and friendship with the money lenders in the 
triad: America, Western Europe and Japan, that controls globalised capitalism, 
Nigeria agreed to abdicate its primary responsibilities to the citizenry namely: the 
provision of basic needs of the people. These needs include basic education, basic 
healthcare, shelter, water, employment, individual and collective security, 
electricity, means of transportation and communication. The elimination of the 
developmental state and the promotion of the market is the policy prescription 
imposed on the countries of the Global South by neo-liberal institutions of 
capitalism. 
Perhaps there was no alternative course of action for Nigeria. Thus, as a matter of 
necessity and to interact successfully with the United States, Nigeria agreed to carry 
out economic reforms based on the ‘Washington Consensus’. The reform 
prescriptions favoured by the World Bank, the IMF and the United States Treasury. 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. all-purpose solution to Nigeria’s economic 
backwardness was rapid “downsizing” of government, de-regulation, liberalisation 
and privatisation, focusing not on equity and social justice concerns but sterile gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth figures. According to the U.S. when Nigeria grants 
unfettered freedom to the market, all its problems will be solved. 
Contrary to that view, Russia has shown that privatisation has often been abused by 
powerful groups and those with political connections. De-regulation, on the other 
hand, has often increased the risks to the poor in some countries without necessarily 
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delivering sustained growth. Needless to say that, the chief beneficiary of the de-
regulation of the Nigerian economy is the U.S. economy. The de-regulation results 
in a massive increase in the rate of capital flight from Nigeria as American monopoly 
investors (among others) take advantage of the liberal environment to repatriate 
profits, dividends, royalties, technical fees and all manner of payments, including 
through transfer pricing, to the detriment of Nigeria’s poverty alleviation 
programmes. 
Given America’s domination and control of the Nigerian economy and coupled with 
Nigeria’s dependence on American finance capital the country lacked the leverage 
to take any proactive action. Thus, American finance capital collaborates with a 
powerful group of Nigerian allies to implement neo-liberal economic policies and 
makes the Nigerian economy neo-colonial. Meanwhile, the bedrock of the 
Washington Consensus economic reform favoured by the U.S. is the unfettered right 
of capital to move about the globe demanding low taxes, little regulation of wages 
and work conditions, small government, privatisation and anti-people policies. And, 
the unrestricted right of international capital is the most profound cause of Nigeria’s 
economic poverty. The pattern of U.S. investment in Nigeria shows that the result of 
unrestricted international capital has not always been positive as domestic forces are 
not able to ensure that U.S. enterprises work in tandem with local development 
policies. U.S. investments are invariably conduit for illegitimate capital outflow. 
They tend to indulge mostly in assemblies without R&D. They exclude Nigerians 
from critical skills. In many cases, they imported patented goods rather than working 
the process thereby precluding the opportunity for the acquisition or transfer of 
technology. Thus, the weakness of the Nigerian economy is the result of the 
peripheral position which Nigeria occupies in the international capitalist division of 
labour as a producer of raw materials for export to the United States. As a result of 
the position, the Nigerian economy is characterised by excessive dependence on 
international finance capital (which largely comes from the U.S.), a weak production 
base, lack of internal inter-sectorial linkages, and lack of internal coherence, mass 
poverty, technological dependence, and excessive external orientation. 
Within the period under study, Nigerian leaders seem to have accepted the U.S., and 
its economic and financial institutions, as senior partners whom they surrendered all 
decision-making about financial and credit policies, economic system, and political 
organisation. Legume (2006) talks about how U.S. has ruled much of sub-Sahara 
Africa through the IMF and the World Bank since the 1980s. 
Elected governments did formally take policy decisions and passed laws through 
their parliaments. However, the budgets of governments under SAPs had to be 
approved by officials of one or both of these international financial institutions, and 
there was often neither the expertise nor the confidence on the part of developing 
countries to protest against this perverse process. The omnipotence of the Bank and 
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the Fund was such that opposition to their policies was apparently impossible. 
Moreover, it did not take long for aspiring politicians to understand what policies to 
propose to garner powerful foreign support. The global market ideology has 
consumed governments everywhere, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991 (Legum, 2006). 
Unlike the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which has responded to its numerous 
critics who see it as the Worst Trade Organisation, by claiming to now promote 
development and raising living standards, rather than maximising trade, the U.S. 
could not respond. The U.S. continued to see the trade with Nigeria as an end in 
itself. The U.S. sees the trade with Nigeria as synonymous with development 
(Moore, 2000, p. 17). Trade is the lens through which the U.S. sees Nigeria’s 
development. Thus, U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations have a market access, rather 
than development, mindset. 
The U.S. carries on with the belief that further integration of the Nigerian economy 
into the global economy will lead to economic growth and development and reduce 
poverty. But the whole concept of getting growth through trade is controversial. 
Thus, the U.S. economic relations with Nigeria is imperialism as it (a) foists, or 
attempts to foist on Nigeria, capitalist values, capitalist institutions, and capitalist 
development; (b) it focuses development analysis on the question of how to make 
Nigeria more like the U.S.; and (c) it propagates mystifications and modes of thought 
and action which serve the interests of the U.S. 
The year 2005 was declared the United Nations (UN’s) “Year of Development”. By 
September that year, the UN Millennium Summit Meeting of Heads of States 
publicised a report. The report contains the advanced countries’ intention to review 
the extent of the fulfillment of their promise to each provide 0.7 percent of their 
Gross National Product (GNP) for aid to poor countries on a path of meeting the 
MDGs. But the 0.7 percent of GNP target was set several decades before. In the heat 
of the Third World’s struggle for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), is it 
not curious that that odd figure of 0.7 per cent has continued to be retained for several 
decades? Even at that, many of the developed states, including the U.S., did not meet 
the target.  
However, at the Millennium Summit; new “commitments” were made concerning 
trade and aid. On aid, the discussion centred, once again around the progress towards 
achieving the old target of 0.7 as well as the conditions attached to them. However, 
the high-level Millennium Summit discussions were informed by two (2) flawed 
assumptions: (a) that developed countries like the U.S. is serious in taking actions 
that can materially shape development in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) like 
Nigeria; and (b) that these actions should consist largely of providing financial 
resources to poor countries. The effects of aid on Nigeria belie both assumptions. It 
is indeed not in the objective interest of the U.S. to ensure economic independence 
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of Nigeria. Therefore, it is an illusion for the U.S. to pose as the guarantor of growth 
for Nigeria by offering financial resources and trade contracts, especially as these 
come under restricting conditions.  
In the period under study, U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations centred on Nigeria’s 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to U.S. goods. But even Adam Smith, the 
father of classical economics and champion of capitalism and free trade, had warned 
about the dangers of free trade for countries like Nigeria when he wrote that; 
Were those high duties and provisions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods 
of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market as to deprive all at 
once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of 
subsistence. The disorder which this would occasion might no doubt be very 
considerable (Smith, 1936, p. 8). 
By the close of the 20th century the proposition of Adam Smith had been fulfilled in 
all segment of the Nigerian economy. But, while the U.S. chanted market access 
mantra in Nigeria, it carefully preserved its protectionist policies at home. It gave 
massive support to its agriculture sector. It did this while mounting very high tariffs 
on many products from Nigeria (Wood, 1995, pp. 57-80). To seal the fate of Nigeria, 
the U.S. branded the protection of Nigerian industries heretical. Christian Aid (2005) 
has rightly observed that through a combination of ideological dogma, conditions 
attached to aid and loan, and straightforward bullying, poor countries have been 
convinced, forced and threatened into accepting that free trade is their only option. 
In pursuit of free trade, the principle of government intervening to safeguard people’s 
livelihoods and set their course for growth and development – something that has 
worked in the past for almost all of today’s developed countries – has been wrongly 
abandoned (Aid, 2005, p. 3). 
The major instruments used to achieve U.S. objectives were the World Bank and the 
IMF. The influence of the twin Bretton Woods institutions in Nigeria is immense. 
By attaching trade liberalisation conditions to grants and loans and by offering trade 
liberalisation-based “advice” to Nigeria, the IMF and the World Bank tore down 
many barriers to U.S. market penetration of Nigeria.  
By history and by experience, by temperament and by inclination, Americans and 
Nigerians are ill-prepared to admit the inevitable outcomes and challenges which 
their economic relations have brought about. The interactions have been made too 
suddenly, and the demands of relations have increased too rapidly, for the evolution 
of a satisfactory economic agreement. Moreover, the state of U.S.–Nigeria’s 
economic relations has been such that a satisfactory economic agreement is probably 
impossible. U.S.–Nigeria’s economic relations satisfy no one. That is why at the end 
of the period under study, questions arose on the possibilities for Nigeria. Questions 
such as what sort of accountability the decision-makers are subject to, what sort of 
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regulation they have to face, who are they answerable to are crucial. As soon as you 
talk about that, you get into the political structures of which trade agreements are 
signed. What political structures have been set up which guarantee that those who 
are the decision-makers; President, Cabinet ministers, face some tough test from the 
civil society. Do Nigerians question their leaders, do they renew them, do they throw 
them out because no matter what you say, it the poor who pay the price of economic 
retardation. As the century ebbed to a close, it was hoped that the two sides (the U.S. 
and Nigeria) will turn the bitter lessons of their economic relations into constructive 
venture in bilateral relations. AGOA reflects that idealism.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study illuminates one central fact about Nigeria’s economic relations with the 
U.S. before AGOA. That is, no nation, no matter how populous or geographically 
impressive is economically self-sufficient and every nation in one form or the other 
imports/exports some types of economic goods/service from/to one or more other 
state(s). Nigeria’s economic relations with the U.S. have greatly intensified over the 
years, despite ostensible efforts at diversification and professed promotion of intra-
African economic promotion. The U.S. was a primary source of Nigeria’s imports, 
private investment, technologies, and external development capital. Nigeria’s 
exports to the U.S. are constituted of primary commodities which suffered habitual 
price distortions and fluctuations. Nigeria’s export activities with the U.S. account 
for the bulk of its gross national product (GNP) and as the source for procuring 
foreign exchange. On the other hand, U.S. exports to Nigeria were dominated by 
industrial and processed consumer goods with continuously escalating prices. The 
study shows that there are built-in impediments in the pattern of trade between 
Nigeria and the U.S. This made Nigeria export primary products to the U.S. and 
imported industrial goods from it. The years of trade relations simply expanded areas 
of further penetration by American capital, agencies, personnel, contractors, and 
consumer goods (including food). This strengthened Nigeria’s dependence on the 
U.S. prior to AGOA. This dependency which has continued under AGOA needs to 
be brought to an end if there need be equity in bilateral trade. 
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